{"ID":6620562,"CreatedAt":"2026-07-15T01:01:48.440468303Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-07-15T03:28:55.185153975Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.12507","arxiv_id":"2607.12507","title":"When Binaries Talk Back: Representation-Confusion Attacks on LLM-Assisted Reverse Engineering","abstract":"LLM-assisted reverse-engineering (RE) systems analyze strings, decompiler output, and tool reports derived from ttacker-controlled binaries. A binary can make data look like instructions or records from one origin look like independent evidence. We call such failures Representation-Confusion Attacks in Reverse Engineering (RARE): the pipeline promotes a correctly extracted observation to instruction authority, claim-validating evidence, or trusted analysis state without the authority or support that role requires. RARE-Bench measures these failures with behavior-checked clean and adversarial binaries. After an exploratory 11,520-call study, we test RARE-Guard's authorization and evidence controls on 20 new programs and two models. Without runtime controls, the models propose a planted unsafe action in 35/40 adversarial cases and 0/40 clean cases. When binary-derived content is shown only as data (Data-Only rendering), they still make 15 unsafe proposals. Tool Authorization denies all 15 and authorizes all 40 matched analyst requests. On identical report drafts, Support Gate validates 23/40 false claims by counting records from one origin separately. Provenance Gate groups those records before counting support, validates 0/40 false claims, and retains all 40 supported claims. We then instrument Ghidra, r2pipe, and angr on 16 further programs. In a preselected eight-program subset, no single-tool draft reaches Support Gate's validation threshold for the false claim. In fused drafts across all 16 programs, Support Gate validates 32/32 false claims. Provenance Gate prevents validation of all 32 and retains all 32 supported claims. A deterministic renderer prevents downgraded claims from reappearing in the final report. Binary-derived content may therefore guide analysis without gaining authority over tools, and views from several tools do not necessarily provide independent evidence.","short_abstract":"LLM-assisted reverse-engineering (RE) systems analyze strings, decompiler output, and tool reports derived from ttacker-controlled binaries. A binary can make data look like instructions or records from one origin look like independent evidence. We call such failures Representation-Confusion Attacks in Reverse Engineer...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.12507","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.12507v1","authors":"[\"Igor Santos-Grueiro\"]","published":"2026-07-14T08:38:10Z","proceeding":"cs.CR","tasks":"[\"cs.CR\"]","methods":"[\"Large Language Model\",\"LoRA\"]","has_code":false}