{"ID":6267088,"CreatedAt":"2026-07-10T01:11:38.759438437Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-07-13T01:02:08.706470581Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.08226","arxiv_id":"2607.08226","title":"Threshold Authorization Without Threshold Signatures: Signature-Agnostic MPC Custody","abstract":"Digital-asset custody has been built on threshold multi-party approval: no operation proceeds unless $t$ of $n$ parties approve, and fewer than t compromised parties can neither authorize nor learn the authorization secret. Threshold signature schemes (TSS) have been the standard mechanism, but the post-quantum transition disrupts this model: standardized hash-based signatures resist efficient threshold signing, and lattice-based threshold protocols remain an emerging research track. We present a dual-gate architecture that separates member authentication from threshold authorization. Each member signs its approval with an ordinary signature under any EUF-CMA scheme; the quorum jointly produces a threshold seal from Shamir-shared secrets bound to the operation. The seal is the base instance of a programmable authorization computation: simple quorum is the minimal policy, while richer policies can evaluate secret-shared state without making the member-signature scheme part of that computation. The signature scheme is a deployment parameter: migrating from ECDSA to SLH-DSA or ML-DSA is a key rotation, not a protocol redesign, and members holding keys in commodity HSMs participate through the standard sign API. The architecture can be deployed wherever the asset-control path supports programmable verification, such as smart contracts, vault modules, or HSMs guarding a master key, and produces an enforcement-layer authorization rather than a native chain signature. Below-threshold secrecy is information-theoretic; an adversary holding $\\geq t$ signing keys but no coefficient shares still cannot produce the seal.","short_abstract":"Digital-asset custody has been built on threshold multi-party approval: no operation proceeds unless $t$ of $n$ parties approve, and fewer than t compromised parties can neither authorize nor learn the authorization secret. Threshold signature schemes (TSS) have been the standard mechanism, but the post-quantum transit...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.08226","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.08226v1","authors":"[\"Dariia Porechna\"]","published":"2026-07-09T08:20:45Z","proceeding":"cs.CR","tasks":"[\"cs.CR\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}