{"ID":5935698,"CreatedAt":"2026-07-07T01:22:02.77346169Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-07-07T02:10:06.972658124Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.03406","arxiv_id":"2607.03406","title":"LeanDY: Type-Based and Trace-Based Symbolic Protocol Verification in Lean","abstract":"Computer-aided formal verification is a widely used approach for the symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols. However, many modern protocols rely on features that remain challenging for existing techniques. In particular, reasoning about state, time-dependent behavior, inductively defined data structures, unbounded executions, and conditional secrecy requires a level of expressiveness that is difficult to reconcile with effective automation. As a result, protocol verification has largely followed two disjoint paths: fully automated methods with limited expressiveness, or interactive proofs in general-purpose theorem provers that offer flexibility but only limited, non-specialized automation. We present an orthogonal approach that bridges this gap by combining compositional type-based reasoning with trace-based reasoning, enabling modular verification of stateful and unbounded protocols. Guided by the language-and-automation co-design (LAC) principle, our approach delivers protocol-specific automation while retaining high expressiveness. We implement this framework as the LeanDY library for the Lean proof assistant, building on and extending the design of DY*, and combining protocol-specific automation with interactive proofs. Our framework supports, in a unified setting, a broad class of functional and security requirements, including secrecy and authentication for stateful protocols, as well as recursive conditional secrecy for protocols using XOR. We formalize SegWit-style blockchain primitives in LeanDY and demonstrate its expressiveness by carrying out an in-depth formalization of payment channels on top of this blockchain model, verifying punishment mechanisms and properties that depend on chain liveness.","short_abstract":"Computer-aided formal verification is a widely used approach for the symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols. However, many modern protocols rely on features that remain challenging for existing techniques. In particular, reasoning about state, time-dependent behavior, inductively defined data structures, unbounde...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.03406","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.03406v1","authors":"[\"Simon Jeanteur\",\"Lorenzo Veronese\",\"Magdalena Soltiro\",\"Matteo Maffei\"]","published":"2026-07-03T15:12:30Z","proceeding":"cs.CR","tasks":"[\"cs.CR\",\"cs.PL\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}