{"ID":3083769,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-05T06:46:15.197025399Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-07T10:52:50.401986833Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06085","arxiv_id":"2606.06085","title":"Revenue Guarantees of No-Swap-Regret Dynamics in First Price Auctions","abstract":"We study the revenue of approximate correlated equilibrium in discrete first price auctions - the set of allowable bids is $\\mathcal{B} = \\{0, 1/k, \\dots, 1 - 1/k, 1\\}$ for some $k \\in \\mathbb{N}$. We show that the revenue of any $ε$-approximate correlated equilibrium is at least $v_2 - Θ(1/k)- Θ(εk^2)$, where $v_2 \\geq 0$ is the second-highest valuation. Our results establish the first polynomial convergence rates on the revenue generated by no-swap regret bidders in first-price auctions. For instance, if bidders admit the optimal swap regret of $\\mathcal{O}(\\sqrt{k T})$, then the time-averaged revenue is at least $v_2 - Θ(1/k) - Θ(ε)$ after $\\mathcal{O}(k^5/ε^2)$ rounds.","short_abstract":"We study the revenue of approximate correlated equilibrium in discrete first price auctions - the set of allowable bids is $\\mathcal{B} = \\{0, 1/k, \\dots, 1 - 1/k, 1\\}$ for some $k \\in \\mathbb{N}$. We show that the revenue of any $ε$-approximate correlated equilibrium is at least $v_2 - Θ(1/k)- Θ(εk^2)$, where $v_2 \\ge...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06085","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.06085v1","authors":"[\"Anders Bo Ipsen\",\"Stratis Skoulakis\"]","published":"2026-06-04T12:23:35Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}