{"ID":3083734,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-05T06:46:15.197025399Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-07T05:32:54.120957816Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06151","arxiv_id":"2606.06151","title":"A Unified Framework for Uniform-Price Resource Allocation Mechanisms","abstract":"Mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource among strategic agents have been widely studied. The prominent paradigm is the proportional (Kelly) mechanism, which elicits a scalar bid per agent, allocates the resource proportionally, and charges payments equal to the bids. Follow-up mechanisms improve social welfare, but sacrifice simplicity by introducing complex allocation rules or unintuitive payments. We introduce a unified framework for designing simple resource allocation mechanisms with proportional-style allocations and uniform pricing. Our framework yields a family of mechanisms that interpolate between the Kelly mechanism and the first-price auction. These mechanisms strictly improve upon Kelly's efficiency guarantees, even achieving full efficiency in equilibrium, while also providing revenue guarantees relative to the VCG mechanism.","short_abstract":"Mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource among strategic agents have been widely studied. The prominent paradigm is the proportional (Kelly) mechanism, which elicits a scalar bid per agent, allocates the resource proportionally, and charges payments equal to the bids. Follow-up mechanisms improve social welfare,...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06151","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.06151v1","authors":"[\"Ioannis Caragiannis\",\"Dimitris Fotakis\",\"Stratis Skoulakis\"]","published":"2026-06-04T13:28:26Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}