{"ID":2923607,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-02T04:05:25.881865328Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-04T13:12:39.622923895Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.02348","arxiv_id":"2606.02348","title":"Privacy-preserving Information Sharing in Oligopoly Competitions","abstract":"Information sharing among competing suppliers can improve decision-making under uncertainty, yet strategic concerns regarding rival exploitation often deter voluntary disclosure. We study information-sharing mechanisms in a Cournot oligopoly with uncertain demand, where a platform aggregates suppliers' signals through privacy-preserving channels and may also possess an exogenous external signal. The central challenge is to balance strategic safety with informational utility: privacy noise reduces the exposure of individual signals, but also lowers the value of the shared information pool. We first characterize a baseline setting in which access to aggregated information is contingent on participation. In a two-firm market without an external signal, firms refuse to share regardless of the privacy level. In an \\(n\\)-firm market, sharing may arise even without privacy safeguards because non-participating firms lose access to the aggregated signal. Building on this baseline, we show that privacy protection alone is insufficient to incentivize disclosure; it must be combined with a sufficiently informative external signal. We further show that firms with more accurate private signals require stronger privacy protection. Overall, our results characterize the sharing-feasible region and highlight the complementarity between privacy design and the external information environment.","short_abstract":"Information sharing among competing suppliers can improve decision-making under uncertainty, yet strategic concerns regarding rival exploitation often deter voluntary disclosure. We study information-sharing mechanisms in a Cournot oligopoly with uncertain demand, where a platform aggregates suppliers' signals through...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.02348","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.02348v1","authors":"[\"Yuxin Liu\",\"M. Amin Rahimian\"]","published":"2026-06-01T14:58:38Z","proceeding":"econ.TH","tasks":"[\"econ.TH\",\"cs.CR\",\"cs.CY\",\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}