{"ID":2898234,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.03252","arxiv_id":"2507.03252","title":"Iterative Vickrey Auctions via Linear Programming","abstract":"Building on the linear programming approach to competitive equilibrium pricing, we develop a general method for constructing iterative auctions that achieve Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcomes. We show how to transform a linear program characterizing competitive equilibrium prices into one that characterizes universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) prices, which elicit precisely the information needed to compute VCG payments. By applying a primal-dual algorithm to these transformed programs, we derive iterative Vickrey auctions that maintain a single price path, eliminating the overhead and incentive problems associated with multiple price paths used solely for payment calculations. We demonstrate the versatility of our method by developing a novel iterative Vickrey auction for the multi-unit setting and an iterative variant of the Product-Mix auction. The resulting auctions combine the transparency of iterative price discovery with the efficiency and incentive properties of the VCG mechanism.","short_abstract":"Building on the linear programming approach to competitive equilibrium pricing, we develop a general method for constructing iterative auctions that achieve Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcomes. We show how to transform a linear program characterizing competitive equilibrium prices into one that characterizes universal...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.03252","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.03252v1","authors":"[\"Sébastien Lahaie\",\"Benjamin Lubin\"]","published":"2025-07-04T01:57:20Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}