{"ID":2896926,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.05738","arxiv_id":"2507.05738","title":"An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information","abstract":"We study $k$-price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with $n$ agents having ordered valuations, we show that any agent, except those with the lowest $k-2$ valuations, can win in equilibrium. As a consequence, worst-case welfare increases monotonically as we go from $k=2$ (second-price auction) to $k=n$ (lowest-price auction), with the first-price auction achieving the highest worst-case welfare.","short_abstract":"We study $k$-price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with $n$ agents having ordered valuations, we show that any agent, except those with the lowest $k-2$ valuations, can win in equilibrium. As a consequence, worst-case welfare incr...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.05738","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.05738v1","authors":"[\"Sumit Goel\",\"Jeffrey Zeidel\"]","published":"2025-07-08T07:35:15Z","proceeding":"econ.TH","tasks":"[\"econ.TH\",\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}