{"ID":2892335,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.15737","arxiv_id":"2507.15737","title":"General Matching Games","abstract":"Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability by requiring robustness to renegotiation and provide general conditions under which pairwise stable and renegotiation-proof outcomes exist as the limit of a deferred acceptance with competitions algorithm together with a renegotiation process. In this article, we extend their model to a general setting encompassing most of one-to-many matching markets and roommates models and specify two frameworks under which core stable and renegotiation-proof outcomes exist and can be efficiently computed.","short_abstract":"Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability by requiring robustness to renegotiation and provide general conditions under whi...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.15737","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.15737v1","authors":"[\"Felipe Garrido-Lucero\",\"Rida Laraki\"]","published":"2025-07-21T15:46:31Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}