{"ID":2880298,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14766","arxiv_id":"2508.14766","title":"Algorithmic Collusion is Algorithm Orchestration","abstract":"We propose a fresh `meta-game' perspective on the problem of algorithmic collusion in pricing games a la Bertrand. Economists have interpreted the fact that algorithms can learn to price collusively as tacit collusion. We argue instead that the co-parametrization of algorithms, in ways as are necessary to obtain algorithmic collusion, typically requires algorithm designers to engage in some form of explicit collusion or `algorithm orchestration.' In our model, the algorithm designers play a meta-game of parametrizing their algorithms, which then play repeated Bertrand competition. The strategic analysis at the meta-level reveals new equilibrium and collusion phenomena. (JEL: C62, C63, D43, L13)","short_abstract":"We propose a fresh `meta-game' perspective on the problem of algorithmic collusion in pricing games a la Bertrand. Economists have interpreted the fact that algorithms can learn to price collusively as tacit collusion. We argue instead that the co-parametrization of algorithms, in ways as are necessary to obtain algori...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14766","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.14766v2","authors":"[\"Cesare Carissimo\",\"Fryderyk Falniowski\",\"Siavash Rahimi\",\"Heinrich Nax\"]","published":"2025-08-20T15:16:16Z","proceeding":"econ.TH","tasks":"[\"econ.TH\",\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}