{"ID":2874028,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.05808","arxiv_id":"2509.05808","title":"Hierarchical Decision-Making in Population Games","abstract":"This paper introduces a hierarchical framework for population games, where individuals delegate decision-making to proxies that act within their own strategic interests. This framework extends classical population games, where individuals are assumed to make decisions directly, to capture various real-world scenarios involving multiple decision layers. We establish equilibrium properties and provide convergence results for the proposed hierarchical structure. Additionally, based on these results, we develop a systematic approach to analyze population games with general convex constraints, without requiring individuals to have full knowledge of the constraints as in existing methods. We present a navigation application with capacity constraints as a case study.","short_abstract":"This paper introduces a hierarchical framework for population games, where individuals delegate decision-making to proxies that act within their own strategic interests. This framework extends classical population games, where individuals are assumed to make decisions directly, to capture various real-world scenarios i...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.05808","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.05808v1","authors":"[\"Yu-Wen Chen\",\"Nuno C. Martins\",\"Murat Arcak\"]","published":"2025-09-06T18:55:03Z","proceeding":"eess.SY","tasks":"[\"eess.SY\",\"cs.MA\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}
