{"ID":2873605,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.07145","arxiv_id":"2509.07145","title":"Efficient Defection: Overage-Proportional Rationing Attains the Cooperative Frontier","abstract":"We study a noncooperative $n$-player game of slack allocation in which each player $j$ has entitlement $L_j\u003e0$ and chooses a claim $C_j\\ge0$. Let $v_j=(C_j-L_j)_+$ (overage) and $s_j=(L_j-C_j)_+$ (slack); set $X=\\sum_j v_j$ and $I=\\sum_j s_j$. At the end of the period an overage-proportional clearing rule allocates cooperative surplus $I$ to defectors in proportion to $v_j$; cooperators receive $C_j$. We show: (i) the selfish outcome reproduces the cooperative payoff vector $(L_1,\\dots,L_n)$; (ii) with bounded actions, defection is a weakly dominant strategy; (iii) within the $α$-power family, the linear rule ($α=1$) is the unique boundary-continuous member; and (iv) the dominant-strategy outcome is Strong Nash under transferable utility and hence coalition-proof (Bernheim et al., 1987). We give a policy interpretation for carbon rationing with a penalty collar.","short_abstract":"We study a noncooperative $n$-player game of slack allocation in which each player $j$ has entitlement $L_j\u003e0$ and chooses a claim $C_j\\ge0$. Let $v_j=(C_j-L_j)_+$ (overage) and $s_j=(L_j-C_j)_+$ (slack); set $X=\\sum_j v_j$ and $I=\\sum_j s_j$. At the end of the period an overage-proportional clearing rule allocates coo...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.07145","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.07145v3","authors":"[\"Florian Lengyel\"]","published":"2025-09-08T18:50:50Z","proceeding":"econ.TH","tasks":"[\"econ.TH\",\"math.OC\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}