{"ID":2872773,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10567","arxiv_id":"2509.10567","title":"Choice Paralysis in Evolutionary Games","abstract":"In this paper, we consider finite-strategy approximations of infinite-strategy evolutionary games. We prove that such approximations converge to the true dynamics over finite-time intervals, under mild regularity conditions which are satisfied by classical examples, e.g., the replicator dynamics. We identify and formalize novel characteristics in evolutionary games: choice mobility, and its complement choice paralysis. Choice mobility is shown to be a key sufficient condition for the long-time limiting behavior of finite-strategy approximations to coincide with that of the true infinite-strategy game. An illustrative example is constructed to showcase how choice paralysis may lead to the infinite-strategy game getting \"stuck,\" even though every finite approximation converges to equilibrium.","short_abstract":"In this paper, we consider finite-strategy approximations of infinite-strategy evolutionary games. We prove that such approximations converge to the true dynamics over finite-time intervals, under mild regularity conditions which are satisfied by classical examples, e.g., the replicator dynamics. We identify and formal...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10567","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.10567v2","authors":"[\"Brendon G. Anderson\"]","published":"2025-09-10T20:00:33Z","proceeding":"econ.TH","tasks":"[\"econ.TH\",\"cs.GT\",\"math.DS\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}