{"ID":2869615,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.13600","arxiv_id":"2509.13600","title":"GNSS Jamming and Spoofing Monitoring Using Low-Cost COTS Receivers","abstract":"The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is increasingly vulnerable to radio frequency interference (RFI), including jamming and spoofing, which threaten the integrity of navigation and timing services. This paper presents a methodology for detecting and classifying RFI events using low-cost commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) GNSS receivers. By combining carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N0) measurements with a calibrated received power metric, a two-dimensional detection space is constructed to identify and distinguish nominal, jammed, spoofed, and blocked signal conditions. The method is validated through both controlled jamming tests in Norway and real-world deployments in Poland, and the Southeast Mediterranean which have experienced such conditions. Results demonstrate that COTS-based detection, when properly calibrated, offers a viable and effective approach for GNSS RFI monitoring.","short_abstract":"The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is increasingly vulnerable to radio frequency interference (RFI), including jamming and spoofing, which threaten the integrity of navigation and timing services. This paper presents a methodology for detecting and classifying RFI events using low-cost commercial off-the-she...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.13600","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.13600v1","authors":"[\"Argyris Kriezis\",\"Yu-Hsuan Chen\",\"Dennis Akos\",\"Sherman Lo\",\"Todd Walter\"]","published":"2025-09-17T00:01:28Z","proceeding":"eess.SP","tasks":"[\"eess.SP\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}