{"ID":2859785,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04640","arxiv_id":"2510.04640","title":"Backing the Wrong Horse: How Bit-Level Netlist Augmentation can Counter Power Side Channel Attacks","abstract":"The dependence of power-consumption on the processed data is a known vulnerability of CMOS circuits, resulting in side channels which can be exploited by power-based side channel attacks (SCAs). These attacks can extract sensitive information, such as secret keys, from the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Existing countermeasures against power-based side channel attacks focus on analyzing information leakage at the byte level. However, this approach neglects the impact of individual bits on the overall resistance of a cryptographic implementation. In this work, we present a countermeasure based on single-bit leakage. The results suggest that the proposed countermeasure cannot be broken by attacks using conventional SCA leakage models.","short_abstract":"The dependence of power-consumption on the processed data is a known vulnerability of CMOS circuits, resulting in side channels which can be exploited by power-based side channel attacks (SCAs). These attacks can extract sensitive information, such as secret keys, from the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Ex...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04640","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.04640v1","authors":"[\"Ali Asghar\",\"Andreas Becher\",\"Daniel Ziener\"]","published":"2025-10-06T09:45:00Z","proceeding":"cs.CR","tasks":"[\"cs.CR\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}