{"ID":2859385,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05986","arxiv_id":"2510.05986","title":"A Small Collusion is All You Need","abstract":"Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) study auction design in the Blockchain context, and emphasize robustness against miner and user collusion, moreso than traditional auction theory. \\cite{chung2023foundations} introduce the notion of a mechanism being $c$-Side-Contract-Proof ($c$-SCP), i.e., robust to a collusion of the miner and $c$ users. Later work \\cite{chung2024collusion,welfareIncreasingCollusion} shows a gap between the $1$-SCP and $2$-SCP classes. We show that the class of $2$-SCP mechanisms equals that of any $c$-SCP with $c\\geq 2$, under a relatively minor assumption of consistent tie-breaking. In essence, this implies that any mechanism vulnerable to collusion, is also vulnerable to a small collusion.","short_abstract":"Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) study auction design in the Blockchain context, and emphasize robustness against miner and user collusion, moreso than traditional auction theory. \\cite{chung2023foundations} introduce the notion of a mechanism being $c$-Side-Contract-Proof ($c$-SCP), i.e., robust to a collusion of the...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05986","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.05986v2","authors":"[\"Yotam Gafni\"]","published":"2025-10-07T14:46:04Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\",\"econ.TH\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}