{"ID":2853941,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.15384","arxiv_id":"2510.15384","title":"Co-Investment in Mobile Edge Computing with Infrastructure Update and Dynamic Participation","abstract":"Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) requires Network Operators (NOs) to undertake substantial infrastructure investments, while most revenues are captured by Service Providers (SPs) offering end-user applications. This cost-revenue imbalance discourages NOs from investing in MEC deployment, despite increasing demand for low-latency and bandwidth-intensive services. This paper proposes a co-investment scheme in which players, i.e., one NO and multiple SPs, jointly deploy, maintain, and share MEC infrastructure over multiple decision epochs. We devise a new coalitional game model that captures the planning of resources, their allocation among players, and cost and revenue sharing. To address fluctuating user demand and evolving participation incentives, we design a mechanism that updates resources and allows the dynamic entrance and exit of players over time. We sustain cooperation through a compensation scheme. Numerical results show that combining resource updates with dynamic participation increases the total payoff and strengthens the NO's incentive to invest.","short_abstract":"Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) requires Network Operators (NOs) to undertake substantial infrastructure investments, while most revenues are captured by Service Providers (SPs) offering end-user applications. This cost-revenue imbalance discourages NOs from investing in MEC deployment, despite increasing demand for low-la...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.15384","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.15384v4","authors":"[\"Amal Sakr\",\"Andrea Araldo\",\"Tijani Chahed\",\"Daniel Kofman\"]","published":"2025-10-17T07:34:50Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}