{"ID":2844807,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.04993","arxiv_id":"2511.04993","title":"On the Coordination of Value-Maximizing Bidders","abstract":"While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among multiple bidders managed by a third-party bidding agent, and strategic bid selection for multiple ad campaigns managed by a single advertiser. We formalize this coordination problem as a theoretical model and investigate the coordination mechanism where only the highest-value bidder competes with outside bidders, while other coordinated bidders refrain from competing. We demonstrate that such a coordination mechanism dominates independent bidding, improving both Return-on-Spend (RoS) compliance and the total value accrued for the participating auto-bidders or ad campaigns, for a broad class of auto-bidding algorithms. Additionally, our simulations on synthetic and real-world datasets support the theoretical result that coordination outperforms independent bidding. These findings highlight both the theoretical potential and the practical robustness of coordinated auto-bidding in online auctions.","short_abstract":"While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among multiple bidders managed by a third-party bidding agent, and strategic bid selecti...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.04993","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.04993v4","authors":"[\"Yanru Guan\",\"Jiahao Zhang\",\"Zhe Feng\",\"Tao Lin\"]","published":"2025-11-07T05:35:24Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}