{"ID":2841831,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.11475","arxiv_id":"2511.11475","title":"Public Goods Games in Directed Networks with Constraints on Sharing","abstract":"In a public goods game, every player chooses whether or not to buy a good that all neighboring players will have access to. We consider a setting in which the good is indivisible, neighboring players are out-neighbors in a directed graph, and there is a capacity constraint on their number, k, that can benefit from the good. This means that each player makes a two-pronged decision: decide whether or not to buy and, conditional on buying, choose which k out-neighbors to share access. We examine both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in the model from the perspective of existence, computation, and efficiency. We perform a comprehensive study for these three dimensions with respect to both sharing capacity (k) and the network structure (the underlying directed graph), and establish sharp complexity dichotomies for each.","short_abstract":"In a public goods game, every player chooses whether or not to buy a good that all neighboring players will have access to. We consider a setting in which the good is indivisible, neighboring players are out-neighbors in a directed graph, and there is a capacity constraint on their number, k, that can benefit from the...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.11475","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.11475v1","authors":"[\"Argyrios Deligkas\",\"Gregory Gutin\",\"Mark Jones\",\"Philip R. Neary\",\"Anders Yeo\"]","published":"2025-11-14T16:52:47Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\",\"cs.DS\",\"econ.TH\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}