{"ID":2840801,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15727","arxiv_id":"2511.15727","title":"Prior-free Collusion-proof Dynamic Mechanisms","abstract":"For a general class of dynamic stochastic multi-player problems, Csóka, Liu, Rodivilov, and Teytelboym (2024) proposed prior-dependent mechanisms. The Guaranteed Utility Mechanism with transfers (TU-GUM) implements efficiency in a Guaranteed Utility Equilibrium (GUE). Its transfer-free variant (NTU-GUM) implements approximate efficiency in ε-GUE. In this paper, we define prior-free versions of both TU-GUM and NTU-GUM. As a special case, we believe that the new prior-free NTU-GUM implements a 1.283-approximation to Pareto efficiency for the repeated single good allocation problem in Fikioris, Banerjee, and Tardos (2024).","short_abstract":"For a general class of dynamic stochastic multi-player problems, Csóka, Liu, Rodivilov, and Teytelboym (2024) proposed prior-dependent mechanisms. The Guaranteed Utility Mechanism with transfers (TU-GUM) implements efficiency in a Guaranteed Utility Equilibrium (GUE). Its transfer-free variant (NTU-GUM) implements appr...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15727","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.15727v1","authors":"[\"Endre Csóka\"]","published":"2025-11-17T20:08:52Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}