{"ID":2835469,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.23097","arxiv_id":"2511.23097","title":"Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem","abstract":"This paper bridges two perspectives: it studies the multi-secretary problem through the fairness lens of social choice, and examines multi-winner elections from the viewpoint of online decision making. After identifying the limitations of the prominent proportionality notion of Extended Justified Representation (EJR) in the online domain, the work proposes a set of mechanisms that merge techniques from online algorithms with rules from social choice -- such as the Method of Equal Shares and the Nash Rule -- and supports them through both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental evaluation.","short_abstract":"This paper bridges two perspectives: it studies the multi-secretary problem through the fairness lens of social choice, and examines multi-winner elections from the viewpoint of online decision making. After identifying the limitations of the prominent proportionality notion of Extended Justified Representation (EJR) i...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.23097","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.23097v1","authors":"[\"Georgios Papasotiropoulos\",\"Zein Pishbin\"]","published":"2025-11-28T11:35:06Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\",\"cs.AI\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}