{"ID":2834470,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.01581","arxiv_id":"2512.01581","title":"The Maxmin Value of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side and Tail-Measurable Payoffs","abstract":"We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff). We show that the maxmin value equals the concavification of the value function of the non-revealing game. In addition, we provide an example demonstrating that, under tail-measurable payoffs, the value of the game may fail to exist.","short_abstract":"We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff). We show that the maxmin value equals the concavification of the value function of the non-revealing game. In addition, we provide an exampl...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.01581","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.01581v1","authors":"[\"Gil Bar Castellon Koltun\",\"Ehud Lehrer\",\"Eilon Solan\"]","published":"2025-12-01T11:54:34Z","proceeding":"math.OC","tasks":"[\"math.OC\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}