{"ID":2833579,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.03930","arxiv_id":"2512.03930","title":"A choice-based axiomatization of Nash equilibrium","abstract":"An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and expansion consistency properties from the literature on abstract choice theory. The axiomatization applies to Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies alike, to games with strategy sets of any cardinality, and it does not require that players' preferences have a utility or expected utility representation.","short_abstract":"An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and expansion consistency properties from the literature on abstract choice theory....","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.03930","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.03930v1","authors":"[\"Michele Crescenzi\"]","published":"2025-12-03T16:29:01Z","proceeding":"econ.TH","tasks":"[\"econ.TH\",\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}