{"ID":2827682,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.16850","arxiv_id":"2512.16850","title":"Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time","abstract":"We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. Given an exogenous signal process, the sender can both garble the evolving signal path and delay the receiver's decision at a convex, increasing cost of time. We show that, although both instruments are available, any optimal persuasion scheme is fully transparent: the sender keeps the signal fully informative and persuades solely by choosing when to stop.","short_abstract":"We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. Given an exogenous signal process, the sender can both garble the evolving signal path and delay the receiver's decision at a convex, increasing cost of time. We s...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.16850","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.16850v1","authors":"[\"Can Urgun\",\"Mark Whitmeyer\"]","published":"2025-12-18T18:22:49Z","proceeding":"econ.TH","tasks":"[\"econ.TH\",\"math.OC\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}