{"ID":2827008,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.17386","arxiv_id":"2512.17386","title":"Deterministic implementation in single-item auctions","abstract":"Deterministic auctions are attractive in practice due to their transparency, simplicity, and ease of implementation, motivating a sharper understanding of when they can attain the same outcomes as randomized mechanisms. We study deterministic implementation in single-item auctions under two notions of outcomes: (revenue, welfare) pairs and interim allocations. For (revenue, welfare) pairs, we show a separation in discrete settings: there exists a pair implementable by a deterministic Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) auction but not by any deterministic dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) auction. For continuous atomless priors, we identify conditions under which deterministic DSIC auctions are equivalent to randomized BIC auctions in terms of achievable outcomes. For interim allocations, under a strict monotonicity condition, we establish a deterministic analogue of Border's theorem for two bidders, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for deterministic DSIC implementability. Using this characterization, we exhibit an interim allocation implementable by a randomized BIC auction but not by any deterministic DSIC auction.","short_abstract":"Deterministic auctions are attractive in practice due to their transparency, simplicity, and ease of implementation, motivating a sharper understanding of when they can attain the same outcomes as randomized mechanisms. We study deterministic implementation in single-item auctions under two notions of outcomes: (revenu...","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.17386","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.17386v2","authors":"[\"Yan Liu\",\"Zeyu Ren\",\"Pingzhong Tang\",\"Zihe Wang\",\"Yulong Zeng\",\"Jie Zhang\"]","published":"2025-12-19T09:43:04Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}