{"ID":2822931,"CreatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","UpdatedAt":"2026-06-01T04:54:23.091178241Z","DeletedAt":null,"paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.01607","arxiv_id":"2601.01607","title":"Existence of Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods: An Elementary Proof","abstract":"We provide an elementary proof that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist in multi-parameter settings whenever the distribution of valuations has finite expectation.","short_abstract":"We provide an elementary proof that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist in multi-parameter settings whenever the distribution of valuations has finite expectation.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.01607","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2601.01607v1","authors":"[\"Sergiu Hart\",\"Noam Nisan\"]","published":"2026-01-04T17:15:27Z","proceeding":"cs.GT","tasks":"[\"cs.GT\",\"econ.TH\"]","methods":"[]","has_code":false}